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The paper develops a short-run model of a small open financially repressed
economy characterized by unorganized money markets, capital good imports, cap-
ital mobility, wage indexation, and flexible exchange rates. The analysis shows
that financial liberalization, in the form of an increased rate of interest on deposits
and tight monetary policy, unambiguously and unconditionally causes deflation.
Moreover, the results do not depend on the degree of capital mobility and structure
of wage setting. The paper recommends that a small open developing economy
should deregulate interest rates and tighten monetary policy if reducing inflation is
a priority. The pre-requisite for such a policy, however, requires the establishment
of a flexible exchange rate regime.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: E31, E44, E52, F41.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Using a modified Mundell-Fleming model that accounts for financial repression, 
the paper analyzes the effects of financial liberalization on inflation. Specifically, 
financial restriction consists of three elements. First, the banking system receives 
favorable treatment and protection because the government can finance the budget 
deficit at a low or zero cost. The government does so forcing the  banks to hold 
government bonds and money through the imposition of “high” multiple reserve 
requirements. Second, since government cannot easily extract revenue from private 
securities, it does not promote the development of private bond and equity markets. 
Finally, interest rate ceilings exist in the banking system to encourage low-cost 
investment and curtail competition with public sector fund raising from the private 
sector. In this context, financial liberalization means a relaxation of the interest rate 
ceiling and lowering of reserve requirements. 
The paper receives motivation from a recent theoretical contribution by Nag and 
Mukhopadhyay (1998). The authors show that the new-structuralist claim, 
propagated by Wijnbergen (1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986), of a tight monetary 
policy and interest rate deregulation, does not hold with import penetration and a 
flexible exchange rate. The stagflationary outcome of the new-structuralist thesis 
does not prove obvious. Our paper builds on Nag and Mukhopadhyay (1998), by 
incorporating capital account mobility along with perfect wage indexation and 
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capital good imports, to show that a higher interest rate on deposits and tighter 
monetary policy will always prove unconditionally deflationary. Moreover, this 
result holds irrespective of the degree of capital mobility and whether the real 
product wage is fixed or not. Our paper compliments and extends Nag and 
Mukhopadhyay (1998).  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 lays out the economic environment 
and Section 3 solves the model and discusses the effects of financial liberalization 
on the rate of inflation. Section 4 concludes. 
II. THE MODEL 
We consider a small open economy, operating under a floating exchange rate 
regime, with one domestically produced good and two different types of imported 
goods -- a consumption good and a capital good. The imported capital good 
combineswith the domestic component to produce the final capital good. We 
assume that the shares of the domestically produced component and the imported 
capital good in investment are exogenous. The imported consumption good also 
account for a fixed share of total consumption expenditure and depends solely on 
income.  The price of the domestic good is endogenous, whilst the prices of the 
imported goods, both consumption and capital, are exogenous. We assume a 
perfectly elastic supply function of the importable goods at a foreign currency 
price of P*. Since P* is parametrically given to the economy, we set it to unity for 
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simplicity. Note that we implicitly assume a linear the production transformation 
schedule for the imported consumption good and the capital good. Thus, the same 
technology applies to both capital formation and the production of consumption 
goods in the world market and, hence, both investment and consumption goods sell 
for the same price of P*. 
“Financial repression” proves severe enough to give rise to an Unofficial Money 
Market (UMM), or the “curb” markets. The curb market establishes an informal 
credit market, where moneylenders and indigenous banks intermediate between 
savers and borrowers, beyond the regulation of the monetary authority. Because of 
no reserve requirements, the curb market resembles a competitive and agile credit 
market, providing more efficient intermediation than the official banking system. 
Moreover, since the banking system operates under interest rate regulations and 
high reserve requirements, the curb market emerges as a residual market that 
absorbs the excess demand for credit from the official banking system.  
Firms unable to obtain low cost funds from the banking system at the regulated 
lending rate turn to the UMM to satisfy their borrowing needs to finance working 
and physical capital (the domestic and imported component) requirements. The 
freely determined rate in the curb market significantly exceeds the deposit and loan 
rates in the official banking system, and reflects the true marginal cost of 
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production. Hence, the UMM rate of interest appears as an argument in both the 
aggregate demand and supply sides of the model. 
Our model of the small open financially repressed economy modifies the standard 
Mundell-Fleming model as outlined in Argy (1994). The basic structure of the 
economy involves four interrelated markets, labor, commodity, money, and foreign 
exchange markets. We start off with the labor market. Unlike the standard 
Mundell-Fleming model, the aggregate supply curve slopes upward under 
reasonable assumptions about wage-price flexibility. 
As a short-run model, the aggregate supply depends solely on conditions in the 
labor market. That is, 
                                   ln [(ln ln ) ]1 c
sQ W P rdβ=− − + .                                    (1)                              
Equation (1) states that the quantity supplied negatively relates to the marginal cost 
of hiring one additional unit of labor. Note that labor represents the working capital 
requirements of the firm, which requires loan financing. Hence, besides the real 
wage (lnW-lnP), the real interest rate of the curb market (rc) also appears in the 
equation. We assume that the nominal wage (W) gets fully indexed to the 
consumer price index (P) (i.e., W=P), where the consumer price index (CPI) equals 
the weighted average of the price of home good (Pd ) and the price of imported 
good (eP*). Since P* equals unity, the movements in the price of the imported good 
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completely reflect variations in the nominal exchange rate, e. So the following 
relationship holds: 
                                 2 2ln ln (1 )lndP P eβ β= + − .                                           (2)   
Substituting equation (2) into equation (1) and introducing time generates the 
aggregate supply equation as follows: 
                                1 2ln [(1 )(ln ln )]
s
t t tdQ e Pβ β= − − − - β1 rct,                         (3) 
where iβ ’s > 0, i =1, 2.  
Next, we turn our attention to the commodity market. The aggregate demand 
positively relates to the level of government expenditure G, exogenous foreign 
output Yf, and the real exchange rate (lne-lnPd). While the real interest rate in the 
curb market (rc) negatively influences the domestic investment demand and, hence, 
the aggregate demand. We postulate an IS curve of the following nature: 
                      1 2 3 4ln (ln ln ) ln ln
d
ct t t t t td fQ e P G r Yα α α α= − + − + ,                   (4)                   
where iα ’s > 0, i= 1, 2, 3, 4. 
To incorporate the role of reserve requirements, we endogenize the supply of 
money. The money demand equation follows the standard liquidity-preference 
theory. Given this, the nominal demand for money function is defined as follows: 
 7
                                    1 2 3ln ln ln
d
t t ctdt dtM P Y i iδ δ δ= + + − ,                           (5) 
where , , ,dt t ctdt andM Y i i  equal, respectively, the nominal money demand, the real 
gross domestic product, the nominal interest rate on deposits, and the nominal 
interest rate on curb market loans. Note that iδ ’s > 0, i=1,2,3. Following the new-
structuralist argument, we assume that a rise in the bank deposit (UMM rate of 
interest) rate causes a reallocation in households’ portfolios toward bank deposits 
(UMM securities) at the expense of UMM securities (bank deposits) and not cash, 
thus, causing money demand to increase (decrease). This assumption makes good 
sense for a developing world, especially where most goods require cash payment 
and, hence, the demand for currency remains relatively inelastic in relation to 
changes in the opportunity cost variables.  
Money supply equals the sum of currency in circulation (C) and supply of bank 
deposits (D). We can write, (Ms )/R= (C/D)(D/R)+D/R, where R equals required 
reserves and Ms equals the nominal supply of money. Alternatively, 
Ms=((1+cu)/q)R, where cu equals the currency-deposit ratio and q equals the 
required-reserve ratio. We assume that banks hold no excess reserves.  
Simple intuition suggests that the currency-deposit ratio depends negatively on Y, 
and di , and positively on ic. The rationale for the sign of the currency-deposit ratio 
with respect to the interest rates reflects the fact that currency demand responds 
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inelasticly to interest rate movements. As Y increases, however, both C and D rise. 
But, assuming that the growth of banking habits means more payments through 
banks, deposits increase more quickly than currency. Hence, the currency-deposit 
ratio negatively correlates with the level of income. Using these arguments and 
given that Ms=((1+cu)/q)R, the money supply function in log-terms conforms to 
the following relation: 
                             1 2 3ln ln ln
s
t t ct t tdtM Y i i R qη η η=− − + + − ,                            (6)                              
where iη ’s >0, i= 1, 2, 3. Combining equations (5) and (6) and realizing that the 
nominal interest rate equals the sum of the real component and the expected rate of 
inflation, treated as exogenous, we generate the following equation from the 
money market equilibrium: 
                                 5 76 8ln ln ln ln
e
t t t ctdt dtR P q Y r iα π α α α= + − + − + ,                 (7) 
where iα ’s > 0, i= 5, 6, 7, 8. Note that 5 7 76 1 1 3 3 8 2 2, , ,α α α η δ α η δ α η δ= = + = + = + . 
Nag and Mukhopadhyay (1998) and Nag (2000) argue that with significant 
dependence of developing countries on imports of intermediate inputs and lack of 
growth of exports due to structural bottlenecks, it proves difficult to maintain a 
fixed exchange rate regime. The tremendous pressure on the balance of payments 
in an open economic environment inevitably leads to the adoption of flexible 
exchange rates. In this paper, we assume that the monetary authority allows the 
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exchange rate to float freely. Accordingly, the equilibrium in the foreign exchange 
market equals the following: 
                *0 9 10 11/ (ln ln ) ln ln ( )t t t ct ct tdt ftB X e P Y Y r r rα α α+= − − + + − ,           (8) 
where iα ’s > 0, i= 9, 10, 11, with 9 1α α> and rt* equals the world rate of interest. 
Note that 11α captures the degree of capital mobility, which can range between zero 
to infinity of from no to perfect capital mobility, respectively. Any positive 
intermediate value reflects imperfect capital mobility. Equation (8) defines the 
overall balance of payments given initial exports (X0), where the first four terms 
determines the current account balance. The current account depends on the 
interest rate in the curb market, because of the import of capital goods. The last 
term captures the capital account balance. Equilibrium in the foreign exchange 
market implies that the balance of payments (BP) = 0.  
III. SOLUTION AND FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION 
The section solves the model and then analyzes the effects of interest rate 
deregulation and lower reserve requirements on inflation and output. Equations (4), 
(7), and (8) constitute the IS, LM, and BP curves, and along with (3) can solve for 
Y, rc, Pd, and e, realizing that Qd = Qs = Y. 
Using equations (4), (7), and (8), we derive the following equation for the 
aggregate demand (AD) curve: 
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Given that 9 1α α> , the signs of the coefficient indicate that the slope and the shifts 
of the aggregate demand curve conform to intuition. 
Using equations (7) and (8), we solve for ln et and substitute the resulting solution 
into equation (3). Thus, the aggregate supply (AS) curve emerges as follows:       
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To ensure that the aggregate supply curve slopes positively (the standard case), we 
impose the condition that 2 3 11 10 9 1(1 )( ) ( )β α α α α α− + + − − > 0, which also helps 
to sign iΨ , i= 3, 5, 6 and 7. This condition likely holds for a higher degree of 
capital mobility, given by 11α , and is obvious when 11α  tends to infinity. Lower 
capital mobility can imply that the aggregate supply curve slopes negatively (the 
non-standard case). To maintain stability in such a case, however, we must ensure 
that the aggregate supply curve though negatively sloped must exhibit a steeper 
slope than the aggregate demand curve (i.e., 1 1| | | |Ω > Ψ ). In the non-standard case, 
except for iΨ , i= 3, 5, 6 and 7, the signs of all the other coefficients of the 
aggregate supply curve do not change from the standard case. Understandably, iΨ , 
i= 3, 6, and 7, in the non-standard case possess signs opposite to that in the 
standard case. 
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Using equations (9) and (10), we derive the solutions for output and the price level 
as follows: 




5 71 2 3 4 6 ,
ln ln ln (11)
ln ln ln ln (12)
t t tft
e
t t t t tdt ft dt
andY Y r G
P Y i r q R Gπ
=Ξ +Ξ +Ξ
=Λ +Λ +Λ +Λ +Λ +Λ +Λ  
where in the standard (non-standard) case,  
               1 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 4 1 4 1 1 1
3 8 1 8 1 1 1
( ) /( )?(?), ( ) /( )?( 0),
( ) /( )?(?),
Ξ = Ω Ψ −Ψ Ω Ψ −Ω Ξ = Ω Ψ −Ψ Ω Ψ −Ω <
Ξ = Ω Ψ −Ψ Ω Ψ −Ω  
and, in both the standard and the non-standard (given, 1 1| | | |Ω > Ψ  ) cases,:  
                   
1 2 2 1 1 2 3 3 1 1 8
5 5 53 4 4 1 1 4 1 1
5 7 76 6 1 1 6 1 1
7 8 8 1 1
( ) /( )?, ( ) /( ) 0,
( ) /( ) 0, ( ) /( ) 0,





Λ = Ω −Ψ Ψ −Ω Λ = Ω −Ψ Ψ −Ω = − <
Λ = Ω −Ψ Ψ −Ω > Λ = Ω −Ψ Ψ −Ω = >
Λ = Ω −Ψ Ψ −Ω = − < Λ = Ω −Ψ Ψ −Ω = >
Λ = Ω −Ψ Ψ −Ω
 
Interestingly, the solution for output does not depend on the monetary policy 
parameter and inflation expectations. Moreover, effect on output corresponding to 
a fiscal policy change proves ambiguous, since the effect on the aggregate supply 
curve is uncertain.  Besides, we observe that the coefficients on the monetary 
policy parameters and inflation expectations do not depend on the degree of capital 
mobility, import elasticities, and aggregate supply curve parameters.          
 Next, we investigate the effects of deregulation of the interest rate ceiling on 
deposits (i.e., an increase in dti ) and also lower reserve requirements (qt) on rate of 
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inflation (gPdt), for both the standard and the non-standard case. A ‘g’ before a 
variable indicates the growth rate, while a ∆  preceding the variable, indicates a 
change in the variable concerned. To derive the reduced-form equation for the rate 
of inflation we first difference equation (12).  
        * 5 71 2 3 4 6( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).
e
t t t t tdt ft dtgP gY i r q gR gGπ=Λ +Λ ∆ +Λ ∆ +Λ ∆ +Λ ∆ +Λ +Λ    (13)       
From equation (12), we can make the following observations: 
(a) Interest rate deregulation unambiguously reduces inflation, and 
(b) A lower reserve requirement policy generates inflation. 
An increase in the controlled rate of interest on deposit increases the demand for 
money and, hence, the rate of interest in the curb market must increase to clear the 
money market. This enhances the cost of the domestic investment and shifts the IS 
curve to the left and reduces real gross domestic product and, hence, the import of 
the consumption good. At the same time, the increase in the UMM rate of interest 
reduces the import of the capital good and causes a capital inflow. The resulting 
surplus causes the nominal exchange rate to fall and shifts the IS curve further to 
the left and the BP curve up, reducing output further. This causes the aggregate 
demand curve to shift to the left, at a given price level.  
On the supply side, the increase in the UMM rate of interest shifts the AS curve up 
due to the cost-push effect, but the decline in the nominal exchange rate reduces 
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the marginal cost of production. The positive effect on the aggregate supply curve 
due to the exchange rate appreciation outweighs the negative effect due to the 
increase in the UMM rate of interest, causing the aggregate supply curve to shift to 
the right. The leftward shift of the AD curve and the rightward shift of the AS 
curve ensures a deflation.  
Such a policy change, however, fails to exert any real effect on output. Intuitively, 
the following sequence of events neutralizes the effects of any monetary policy on 
output: As the price level falls, the real exchange rate increases and shifts the IS, 
BP, and LM curves to the right, such that in the end all the curves return to their 
original positions. With real exchange rate and real interest rate unchanged, none 
of the schedules move any further.   
A reduction in the reserve requirement implies a loose monetary policy and the 
curb market rate of interest must fall to ensure the money market equilibrium. 
Henceforth, the analysis follows exactly the opposite path to the one discussed 
above corresponding to an increase in the controlled interest rate on deposits. The 
aggregate demand curve shifts to the right while the aggregate supply curve shifts 
to the left causing inflation but, as before, no real effects. 
For the non-standard case, given that 1 1| | | |Ω > Ψ , all coefficients in equation (13) 
exhibit the same sign as the standard case. The effect on the aggregate demand 
curve, corresponding to changes in the policy variable, matches the standard case. 
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The aggregate supply curve, however, moves in the opposite direction to that 
discussed above. The cost-push effect of the interest rate dominates the 
employment and output effects corresponding to exchange rate changes.  
The increase in the controlled rate of interest causes the AS curve to shift to the 
left. With the aggregate demand curve shifting left as well, the price level falls, as 
the latter shift tends to outweigh the former. Moreover, just as in the standard case, 
relaxation of the reserve requirement causes inflation with no real effects. The 
results occur because the coefficients of the monetary policy variables do not 
depend on the slope parameters of the AS and AD curves. 
 In summary, the following results emerge: (i) Deregulation of interest rate on 
deposits and a tight monetary policy (i.e., a rise in q or a fall in R) unambiguously 
and unconditionally cause deflation; (ii) The effect on the GDP is, however, 
neutral. 
As a corollary, suppose that real product wage is fixed (i.e., 2 1β = ). Then, the 
aggregate supply curve slopes negatively. For stability, we assume that 1 1| | | |Ω > Ψ  
holds. Exactly the same results on the price level and output occur – a deflation 
with no real effect from interest rate deregulation and tight monetary policy. The 
coefficient of the monetary policy parameters in the reduced-form solution of the 
rate of inflation do not depend on the supply curve elasticities with respect to real 
wage and the curb market interest rate. As before, monetary policy is neutral. This 
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corollary proves important, especially in the light of the new-structuralist thesis of 
stagflation. In Wijnbergen (1983), the real wage is fixed and the contractionary 
effect of credit generates stagflation. Here, we show that even with a fixed real 
wage, stagflation cannot occur.  
IV. CONCLUSION AND AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH 
The paper modifies the standard Mundell-Fleming model and analyzes the effects 
of financial liberalization on domestic inflation and GDP. Considering a small 
open financially repressed economy characterized by an unofficial money market, 
perfect wage indexation, capital good imports, and capital mobility, we show that 
interest rate deregulation reduces inflation with no effect on the output. The result 
sharply contrasts with the new-structuralist claim of stagflation following interest 
rate deregulation, once we allow for exchange rate flexibility. Tight monetary 
policy produces similar effects on inflation and real GDP. The results do not 
depend on whether high or low capital mobility  and whether a fixed or variable 
real wage exist. The critical requirement is a flexible exchange rate regime. 
The model makes the following recommendations. A small open developing 
economy should deregulate interest rates and tighten monetary policy, if reducing 
inflation is a priority. To achieve this goal, however, the economy must establish a 
flexible exchange rate regime. The degree of capital mobility and the wage-
structure do not matter. 
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To extend the current analysis, we could endogenize the process of expectation 
formulation along the lines of rational expectation, and analyze whether such a 
change affects our existing results. Further, since the current model does not 
include any microfoundations, it could prove interesting to analyze the long-run 
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